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help explain the very wide range of output adjustment across 
East Asia in response to the 1997-98 crisis. A general 
equilibrium model is presented where leverage and output are 
linked by low investment and capital sales triggered by the 
threat of bankruptcy. In the model developed here, highly 
leveraged firms facing a cutoff of capital inflows, which are 
threatened by bankruptcy, respond first by eliminating 
investment and then by selling their capital goods - at a 
discount - to try to stay afloat. Lower investment and wasteful 
capital sales shrink the aggregate capital stock, trigger 
deflationary pressures, and contract overall output. In contrast, 
less leveraged firms, which are not threatened by bankruptcy, 
would not have to respond by lowering investment and raising 
costly capital sales. Therefore, a higher corporate leverage may 
induce a greater output contraction during the crisis. The 
available data are consistent with the assumptions and 
predictions of the model.
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I. Introduction
The cutoff of capital inflows that triggered the East Asian crisis in 
1997 was followed by a remarkably wide range of output responses. 
For example, the real GDP of Indonesia contracted by 14 percent in 
1998, whereas for Taiwan Province of China real GDP expanded by 5 
percent. What explains this wide disparity? This paper posits that 
cross-country differences in corporate leverage help explain the wide 
range of post-crisis output adjustment. This explanation is motivated 
by the fact that the cutoff of capital inflows affected all countries in 
the region, whereas the output contractions were most severe for 
those countries with high levels of corporate debt. Further, invest- 
ment and inventory contractions in these countries accounted for the 
bulk of their output declines in 1998, and significant sales of physical 
capital were made at large discounts.
To link corporate leverage to output adjustment, this paper 
presents a general equilibrium small open economy model with 
bankruptcy and wasteful capital sales. In the model, firms borrow 
short-term foreign bonds, which may or may not be rolled over. If 
the bonds are not rolled over, which is an adverse and exogenous 
liquidity shock, there is a pecking order of firms’ responses. Firms 
meet their debt obligations first by canceling dividends and cutting 
back investment, then by undertaking distress sales of physical 
capital at a discount. Firms unable to meet their debt obligations go 
bankrupt and must liquidate their capital, but at an even larger 
discount. 
This model allows for the assessment of the impact of a cutoff of 
external credit on the real economy for economies with different 
levels of leverage. In a low debt economy, a cutoff of capital inflows 
has little or no impact on the real economy because firms need not 
curtail investment or sell their capital to stay afloat. By contrast, a 
cutoff of capital inflows contracts the aggregate output of economies 
with heavily leveraged firms. In the medium-debt case, firms stay 
afloat by eliminating investment and selling their capital at the 
distress discount. These actions shrink the capital stock, and 
subsequently decrease output. In the high-debt case, which is 
intended to proxy the highly leveraged East Asia countries, some 
firms go bankrupt and must not only eliminate investment but also 
sell all of their capital. Lower investment and capital sales again 
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FIGURE 1
EAST ASIA: REAL GROWTH, CAPITAL INFLOWS AND 
CORPORATE LEVERAGE, 1996-98
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contract aggregate output, but by more than for a medium-debt 
economy, reflecting the tighter budget constraints and larger capital 
sales discount faced by liquidating firms.1
Furthermore, the model captures a future deflation channel. If 
firms borrow both one-and two-period bonds, the output contraction 
is amplified by extra future deflation. In this case, everybody knows 
that leveraged firms will have to sell capital next period as well as in 
the current period. These future capital sales will exert extra 
deflationary pressure today, further reducing investment and the 
capital stock, and amplifying the output contraction.
The available empirical evidence is then reviewed to gauge the 
validity of the assumptions and predictions of the model. The data 
indicate that the cutoff of external credit to East Asia was abrupt, 
large, and pervasive. The pre-crisis extent of corporate leverage in 
several East Asia countries was quite high by international 
standards, and a large number of corporations in these highly 
leveraged countries went bankrupt. Large contractions in investment, 
which is concentrated in the corporate sector, dragged down output 
during 1998 in the leveraged countries. Moreover, in Korea, and to a 
lesser extent in other countries, capital sales were made at 
substantial discounts. Thus, the available evidence seems to be 
broadly consistent with the assumptions and predictions of the 
model.
The literature on the East Asia crisis that deals with the origins of 
the crisis and aims to explain cross-country contagion is large.2 The 
most important of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing 
explanations of the origins of the crisis are: common external shocks 
(Masson 1998); cross-country trade and financial market linkages 
(Glick and Rose 1998); financial market contagion (Goldstein 1998; 
Calvo and Mendoza 1998); monetary policy that was too tight (e.g. 
Sachs and Radelet 1998) or too loose (Lane et al. 1999); tight fiscal 
1
Investment does not follow from an interior solution that strikes a 
balance between marginal gain and cost, as in the low-debt case; rather, 
investment is determined in a corner solution pulled down by the liquidity 
constraint.
2 For analyses of the origins of the East Asia crisis, see Corsetti et al. 
(1998), Masson (1998), and Krugman (1999). For an overview of 
macroeconomic developments during the East Asia crisis see Coe and Kim 
(2002), World Bank (1998), Roubini et al. (1998), Lane et al. (1999), and 
Kochhar et al. (1998).
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policy (Sachs and Radelet 1998); domestic bank over lending 
(Corsetti et al. 1998; Krugman 1998; Dooley 1997); political risks 
(Roubini et al. 1998); and excessive corporate leverage via current 
account adjustment (Krugman 1999).
This paper, in contrast, is concerned with the aftermath of the 
crisis, and thus is complementary to much of the literature.3 
Corporate leverage is taken as a starting condition, and is used to 
explain cross-country differences in output adjustment in response 
to a cutoff of capital inflows. This paper shares the view with 
Krugman (1999) in that corporate leverage explains the impact of a 
credit cutoff on output. This paper, however, emphasizes that 
leverage and output are linked by low investment and capital sales 
triggered by the threat of bankruptcy, while Krugman focuses on 
current account balance.4
To concentrate on the impact of corporate leverage on output 
adjustment, we here do not address the market imperfections that 
led to the buildup of corporate debt in the first place.5 In addition, 
we abstract away banks (which in some countries channeled capital 
inflows to corporations) from the analysis, on the implicit assumption 
3 Output adjustments prompted by other crises of the 1990s have received 
considerable attention. The unexpected brevity of the recession in Mexico 
during 1994-95 was ascribed by Roubini et al. (1998) to strong growth in the 
U.S. and limited contagion. The prolonged output decline in the transition 
countries of eastern Europe during the early 1990s also generated wide 
interest and controversy (Berg 1994; Fischer et al. 1996). Excessive corporate 
debt does not seem to have been the subject of previous analyses, probably 
because the level of corporate debt in East Asia is unprecedentedly high. 
Stone (1998; 2000a; 2000b) provides a general assessment of corporate sector 
dynamics in systemic financial crises and corporate sector restructuring in 
East Asia. See also Hutchison and Noy (2005).
4 Krugman (1999) suggests that a cutoff of capital inflows reduces 
investor/borrower wealth and shifts up the current account balance, which 
requires an output contraction and depreciation-led import compression. 
Worse, the depreciation raises external debt payment and furthers reduce 
wealth, investment, and output, and puts the economy into a low output 
equilibrium.
5
The initial debt-equity ratio will be determined by governance, openness, 
and other factors. Johnson et al. (1999) concluded that corporate governance 
explains the extent of depreciations and stock market declines in the East 
Asia crisis better than standard macroeconomic measures. World Bank 
(1998), Stone (2000a), and Gobat (1998) discuss the determination of 
debt-equity ratios in East Asia during the run up to the crisis. See also Kim 
(2004).
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that the crisis is rooted more in high levels of corporate debt than in 
moral hazard-driven domestic lending or bank runs, and that the 
independent role of banks is less important than the root 
weaknesses of the corporate sector.
The paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in 
Section II, and applied to the low, medium, and the high debt cases 
in Section III. The empirical evidence is presented in Section IV, and 
Section V concludes.
II. The Basic Model
A simple general equilibrium small open economy model is 
developed here to analyze the consequences of different levels of 
corporate leverage for the adjustment of aggregate output to a 
sudden cutoff of capital inflows.
A. Firms
There are a continuum of firms at time t, indexed by j∈(0, nt),
nt＞0. Each firm has a constant returns to scale production function 




1－α                                                         (1)
where yt denotes value added from current output, kt capital stock, lt 
labor, and α (∈(0,1)) the capital share parameter (subscripts denoting 
that the variable is for an individual firm are for the most part 
omitted). Each firm has an identical level of capital at the time of the 
liquidity shock. In the context of this paper, capital stock can be 
broadly interpreted to include inventory, especially if the high rate of 
post-crisis inventory decumulation in East Asia reflects fire sales of 
inventory by leveraged corporations (as opposed to typical business 
cycle factors as in Ramey and West (1997)). This model introduces 
capital irreversibility into the literature on post-crisis output 
adjustment.6 The transformation of a unit of capital sold by a 
troubled firm back into a final good, and thereafter into capital or 
consumption by a new owner, is assumed to be wasteful (putty-clay 
6 See Pindyck (1991) and Bernanke (1983) for analysis of the effects of 
irreversibility on investment.
CORPORATE LEVERAGE AND OUTPUT ADJUSTMENT 425
technology). The wastefulness of capital sales arises from:
 •physical/technological traits of an asset, such as embodied 
technology, factor substitution possibilities, and in the types of 
products they can produce, limit its alternative uses, and 
thereby make it less useful to the buyer than to the seller 
(Williamson 1988);7
 •asset market imperfections, such as market thinness or 
information asymmetries, that drive a wedge between the 
replacement cost of an asset and its purchase price (Ramey 
and Shapiro 2001); and,
 •macroeconomic considerations that reduce the asset sale price 
to below its value in best use. Specifically, shocks that induce 
an asset sale generally also reduce the cash flow of potential 
buyers in the same industry and thus lower the price they can 
pay. (If assets are sold outside the industry, asset market 
imperfections may further reduce the sales price.) The large 
economy-wide shocks and interindustry shifts in assets 
(including large sales to foreign investors) in East Asia suggest 
these macroeconomic considerations could be substantially 
reducing asset sale prices in the region. Capital sold under 
distress or liquidating conditions is assumed to be wasteful.
The wastefulness of capital sales is normally much higher when 
firms went bankrupt than when they stay afloat. Thus, we 
distinguish between capital sales by firms that stay afloat and by 
firms that go bankrupt. Distress capital sales (st
d ), defined as capital 
sales made by firms that successfully stay afloat in the face of a 
liquidity shock, are at a discount:8
st
d＝z kt
d,       z＜1                                           (2)
7
Ramey and Shapiro (2001) use the real-life example of a wind tunnel 
capable of producing winds up to 270 miles per hour that was sold by an 
aerospace company and rented out to bicycle helmet designers and 
architects, who required wind speeds much less than 270 miles per hour. 
This sale can be viewed as wasteful because a key trait of the wind 
tunnel-high air speeds-had no value for the new users.
8 Studies of distress capital sales indicate that these discounts are quite 
large: the sale of the Campeau retail empire was at discounts of 32 percent 
(Kaplan 1989), and Ramey and Shapiro (2001) concluded that the discount 
(sales price relative to replacement value) on asset sales in the airline 
industry is 43-63 percent during a sectoral downturn.
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where kt
d is the amount of capital stock sold, z is the price of a unit 
of capital on distress sales, and thus (1－z) is the discount, or the 
amount of a unit of capital wasted. This relatively simple specifica- 
tion is used rather than an explicit model of a physical capital 
market for the sake of tractability. 
Liquidation capital sales (st
l ), defined as capital sales made by 




l,         x＜z                                      (3)
where kt
i is the amount of capital stock sold by bankrupt firms, x is 
the price of a unit of capital on liquidation sales.
Because the liquidation price x is less than the distress price z, 
firms always undertake wasteful (distress) capital sales to avoid a 
bankruptcy-induced wipe out of their value.9 Firms issue bonds and 
equity. The cost of capital is a weighted sum of the cost of bonds, 
which pay real interest rbt, and the net cost of equity ret, which is the 
sum of dividend yield and capital gains.10 The number of equity 
shares is kept constant at Q, so that new investment is financed by 
retained earnings. The debt-equity ratio λ is the crucial starting 
condition of the analysis. The cross-country difference in the debt- 
equity ratio may reflect the differences in tax incentives, regulations, 
corporate governance, and other factors across countries.
The liquidity shock takes the form of an interruption of the 
rollover of foreign debt. Borrowing in terms of domestic currency is 
etbt, where bt denotes one-period dollar-denominated foreign bonds 
and et is the exogenously-given exchange rate. Bonds are assumed to 
be short term to capture the strong reliance of corporations in East 
Asia on short-term credit to finance long-term investment. Ordinarily, 
9
The assumption of x＜z can be justified on the grounds that: the assets 
of nonviable firms are less deployable than those of other firms; economies 
with bankrupt firms will be in deep recession and therefore asset prices will 
be lower; and that firms have distinct classes of physical capital (ki) which 
differ in their reversibility, and when the liquidity constraint is binding, the 
firm sells first its units of capital that involve less waste. A case study of the 
liquidation of the assets of a machine tool manufacturer reported discounts 
of 50 to 70 percent (Holland 1990).
10
That is, ret＝dt＋(qt－qt－1)/qt－1 where qt is the price of equities, and dt is 
the dividend yield (Dt/qt-1Q where Dt is total dividends). Given the debt-capital 
ratio λ , the total real cost of capital is ρ t＝rbtλ＋ret (1－λ ).
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foreign creditors renew the bonds, but when their confidence falters, 
especially in response to external developments, they may suddenly 
at the beginning of the period refuse to roll over the debt, which 
from the standpoint of the firm is a random liquidity shock with 
probability φ. Since the rate of interest is given at the international 
level rbt, the liquidity shock does not alter the bond interest rate, but 
it does change the return on equity.
Profits left over from interest and wage payments are used first to 
raise investment, and then are paid to shareholders as dividends, as 
long as the liquidity constraint is non-binding. However, if the debt 
is not rolled over and the liquidity constraint binds, then the firm 
pays its principal and interest payments, and allocates the rest of 
profits to investment and dividends. If profits fall short of debt 
payments and the unconstrained level of investment, then the firm 
pays no dividends at all.
Firms sell part or all of their capital stock if profits are insufficient 
to meet their debt payment. The liquidity shock is revealed at the 
beginning of the period, but principal and interest payments take 
place after production, so that firms can use their capital for current 
production, and then sell it in the same period. The portion of 
capital stock sold within period t, a choice variable for the firm, is 
denoted by γt. Thus, the amount of capital sold is γt (1－δ )kt, and the 
law of motion for capital is
kt＋1＝(1－γt)(1－δ )kt＋it                               (4)
where δ is the depreciation rate, and it denotes gross investment.
Firms are risk-neutral and maximize the present discounted value 
of their net cash flows. The firm’s value and cost of capital are 
derived from its constraints, following Brock and Turnovsky (1981) 
and Kim (1998). If the firm does not go bankrupt, its value is:






where ρs is the firm's discount rate, wt is the wage rate and Et is the 
expectation operator given information at time t. The firm chooses its 
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its value, taking prices as given.
The firm's operative liquidity constraint depends on whether or not 
it is hit by a liquidity shock:
No liquidity shock: pt yt－wt lt＋pt z γt(1－δ)kt≥ rbtetbt
(with probability 1－φ)
   Liquidity shock: pt yt－wtlt＋pt z γt(1－δ)kt≥ (1＋rbt )etbt
   (with probability φ)
Finally, the model incorporates bankruptcy for nonrepayment of 
debt. If a firm cannot meet its debt obligation in the current period 
(i.e. if the liquidity constraint binds) even after eliminating investment 
and dividends, and selling all of its capital, then it goes bankrupt.11 




＝x (1－δ)kt                                          (6)
B. Consumers
There are a large number of identical consumers in the economy 
measured as m＜nt who maximize the following intertemporal utility 
function:
 
                               E0   β
tct                          (7)  
where ct is consumption of each resident and β is the subjective 
discount factor. Each consumer has one unit of time for labor and 




                          (8)
11
The assumption here is that the creditor is willing to let the firm go 
bankrupt when it cannot meet the current payment and even before it is 
technically insolvent based on its net present value i.e. the creditor would 
rather pull out immediately than reschedule the bonds. This assumption 
accords with the quick withdrawal of creditors in East Asia during late 1997 
and 1998 (Roubini et al. 1998), and is in the same spirit as the show me the 
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where Qt＋! is the demand for equity, and lt
s is the supply of labor. 
The left hand side is expenditures, i.e., consumption and equity 
purchases. The right hand side is net income, or the sum of income 
from equity and labor. Labor is not mobile over one period because it 
is costly for the agent to move to work for a new firm. Given prices 
and a fixed supply of equity (i.e., Qt＝Qt＋1), each consumer supplies 
one unit of labor and consumes
ct＝(wt ＋dtqtQt)/pt                                       (9)
Consumption decreases in response to an increase in pt and 
realization of the adverse liquidity shock, which shifts the domestic 
demand curve to the left. Net export demand of the final good 
reflects the real exchange rate:
NXt＝NX(et /pt), NX'＞0                                  (10)
C. Aggregate Supply and Demand
The supply of each surviving firm (denoted by st) is the sum of its 
current production, as well as its distress capital sales, if any,
st＝yt＋st
d
                                         (11)
Similarly, the supply of each liquidating firm in time t is simply 
the sum of its output and capital sales st
l.12 Capital sales increase 
the available supply of goods to beyond the level of current 
production/value added, and thereby shift out the supply curve. 
Aggregate supply at time t (denoted by St) is thus the sum over all 
firms of aggregate current production and aggregate distress and 
liquidating capital sales
St＝∑Aktα lt1－α＋∑zγt(1－δ)kt ＋∑x (1－δ)kt                  (12)
Finally, aggregate demand is
Dt＝mct＋∑it ＋NXt                                          (13)
12 Appendix examines the case where bankruptcy and capital sales take 
place before production.
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Note that, in this model, consumption and investment can come 
not only from currently produced output, but also from capital sales.
III. The Impact of a Liquidity Shock on the Real Economy
The impact of an adverse liquidity shock on an economy critically 
depends on the level of corporate leverage. In this section, we 
distinguish between low-debt, medium-debt and high debt regimes, 
and analyze the impact of a liquidity shock on output, wages, and 
prices for a low-debt economy as a benchmark case. We then 
compare the benchmark case with the cases of medium and 
high-debt economies and a two-period bond case. These comparisons 
show a direct relation between corporate leverage and the magnitude 
of a liquidity shock-induced output contraction.
A. Low-Debt Regime: Neither Capital Sales nor Bankruptcies
In this benchmark case, debt is so small that firms need not sell 
capital even in the event of a liquidity shock.
Low-Debt Regime: For all firms j∈(0, nt) and for all t:
         ptyt－wt lt＞(1＋rbt)etbt
Even if the debt is not rolled over (requiring the firm to come up 
with (1＋rbt)etbt rather than rbtetbt) the liquidity constraint is not 
binding, implying that firms never have to sell their capital.
The optimal capital stock and investment are determined in the 
low-debt case as if there were no liquidity shock. The optimizing firm 
equates its net marginal return from investment to the net marginal 
cost
pt((dyt/dkt)＋zγt(1－δ))＝pt －1(ρ t －δ)                           (14)
implying that the capital stock in t, and investment in t－1, are 
decreasing in the relative price pt －1/pt  and also reflect the values of 
z and γ. This relationship and the other first order condition that the 
real wage rate equals the marginal productivity of labor generate the 
optimal capital-labor ratio, which, given the constant labor supply, 
yields the optimal capital stock.
Although low-debt firms have the option of selling their capital to 
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other firms and households (domestic or foreign) they will not do so 
because capital sales reduce their value, as can be seen from the 
derivative of V0 with respect to γt:
dV0/dγt＝(z－1)pt (1－δ)kt ＜0                                 (15)
Therefore, the optimal level of capital sales is γt＝0 for all j∈(0, nt). 
If the profit remaining after debt payment is large enough to finance 
the level of investment needed for the optimal level of capital stock, 
then the liquidity constraint can be seen as nonbinding. Alterna- 
tively, the liquidity constraint binds if the amount available for 
investment falls short of that needed to yield the optimal capital 
stock. In both cases, however, firms make positive investment to at 
least compensate for the depreciation of capital.
Aggregate supply is
St＝nt[(pt /wt )(1－α )](1－α )/αkt                                (16)
which is a standard upward-sloping supply curve. Aggregate demand 
is
Dt＝mct＋nt it＋NXt ＝m(wt＋dtqtQt )/pt＋nt it＋NXt               (17)
which is a downward-sloping curve.
B. Medium-Debt Regime: Capital Sales but No Bankruptcies
Corporate leverage is high enough to adversely impact the real 
sector in the medium-debt economy. Here, the elimination of 
investment and wasteful capital sales by medium-debt firms 
struggling to stay afloat in the face of a liquidity shock reduce the 
aggregate capital stock, contract output, and lower prices
   
Medium-Debt Regime: For low debt firms j∈(0, (1－θ1)nt):
               ptyt－wt lt＞ (1＋rbt)etbt,
       For medium-debt firms j∈((1－θ1)nt, nt):
               ptyt－wt lt≤ (1＋rbt)etbt＜ptyt＋ptz(1－δ)kt－wt lt
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The profits of medium-debt firms are insufficient to pay off their 
debt if it is not rolled over, but they can avoid bankruptcy by 
eliminating investment and selling their capital.
After the adverse liquidity shock, medium-debt firms must choose 
between: (i) going bankrupt and selling their capital at the 
liquidation price (x＜1), or (ii) staying afloat by repaying their debt 
through sales of their capital at the distress price (z＜l). Since z＞x, 
they choose to stay in business. They produce current output, then 
sell γtz(1－δ)kt  of their capital to low-debt firms and households 
(both domestic and foreign), but only up until the liquidity constraint 





which are positive, and are increasing in rbt and bt and decreasing in 
z and yt.
Since the only way these firms can finance new investment is by 
selling capital at a loss, they invest nothing. Thus, investment does 
not follow from an interior solution that strikes a balance between 
marginal gain and cost, as in the low-debt case; rather, investment 
is determined here in a corner solution pulled down by the liquidity 
constraint.
Output in time t is unaffected by the shock since capital used for 
production in t is determined in the previous period (Eq. (4)). Thus, 
the output of both types of firms in the medium-debt case is the 
same as in the benchmark low-debt case.
However, output contracts in the period after the liquidity shock. 
The capital stock for medium-debt firms, who do not invest because 
they are liquidity-constrained, declines to kt＋1＝(1－γt)(1－δ)kt. 
Low-debt firms may raise their investment compared to the 
benchmark low debt case, due to intertemporal substitution following 
the increase in pt＋1 over pt. However, it will not be large enough to 
offset the reduction in capital of medium-debt firms because of 
diminishing marginal returns. The resulting reduction in the level of 
aggregate capital, given a constant labor supply, will lead to a 
contraction in the valued added in t＋1. The magnitude of the output 
contraction reflects the extent of the capital reduction γ, which, in 
turn, reflects the value of z.
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Real wages are also reduced with a lag. Real wages are not 
impacted right away by the liquidity shock because labor supply per 
firm is determined at lt＝m/nt , which is unaltered by the liquidity 
shock because there are no bankruptcies. However, the decline in 
aggregate capital stock at time t＋1, reduces the marginal product of 
labor, and therefore the real wage drops.
Prices in a medium-debt economy are reduced in period t by an 
adverse liquidity shock. The supply curve of the individual 
medium-debt firm is shifted to the right by distress capital sales, 
implying a proportional (by θ1n) shift of their supply, and a 
rightward shift of the aggregate supply curve by θ1nγtz(1－δ)kt . 
Meanwhile, the aggregate demand curve shifts to the left as domestic 
demand declines not only because investment of medium-debt firms 
falls to zero, but also due to lower consumption resulting from the 
elimination of their dividends. The rightward supply curve shift and 
leftward demand curve shift generate a decline in aggregate prices. 
The increase in aggregate supply due to capital sales will be met by 
an increase in net foreign exports induced by a real exchange rate 
depreciation from the fall in domestic prices. In addition, aggregate 
supply in t＋1 will no longer include capital sales, and hence the 
supply curve is likely to shift back to the left, implying a subsequent 
reflation.
Finally, following the phase of adjustment to the liquidity shock, 
output in this model will move back to its pre-crisis level. Indeed, if 
foreign capital flows resume in the next period, then investment of 
the medium debt firms will quickly push the capital stock back to its 
steady state, which induces inflation in the next period, and rapidly 
increases output.
   
C. High-Debt Regime: Capital Sales and Bankruptcies
In the high-debt economy, some firms go bankrupt, as happened 
in East Asia during the 1997-98 financial crisis. In this high-debt 
regime, there are low-debt firms, medium-debt firms who stay afloat 
by reducing investment and selling capital, and high-debt firms that 
go bankrupt and must liquidate their capital.
High-Debt Regime: For low debt firms j∈(0, (1－θ1－θ2)nt):
               ptyt－wt lt＞(1＋rbt)etbt.
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       For medium-debt firms j∈((1－θ1－θ2)nt, (1－θ2)nt)
               ptyt－wt lt≤(1＋rbt)etbt＜ptyt＋ptz(1－δ)kt－wt lt .
       And for high-debt firms j∈((1－θ2)nt, nt)
               ptyt＋ptz(1－δ)kt－wt lt＜(1＋rbt)etbt.
High-debt firms go bankrupt if their debt is not rolled over, even if 
they eliminate investment and sell all of their capital. Immediately 
after the liquidity shock, they produce, undertake liquidation sales of 
capital, pay wages wt lt, and distribute the remaining revenue to their 
creditors.
Again, output contracts in time t＋1, but by more than in the 
medium-debt economy. The reason is that the decline in aggregate 
capital stock is larger in the high-debt regime due to the greater 
wastefulness of liquidation capital sales compared to distress sales 
(x＜z). Real wages are not altered during the period of the liquidity 
shock, but they fall in the next period, again due to the reduction in 
aggregate capital stock, and by more than in the medium-debt 
economy.
Finally prices also fall in time t after a liquidity shock. The 
aggregate supply curve is
St ＝nt [(pt /wt )(1－α )](1－α )/αkt＋θ1ntγt (1－δ)kt＋θ2ntx (1－δ)kt        (19)
The rightward shift of the supply curve exceeds that of the 
medium-debt regime due to greater capital sales. Similarly, the 
aggregate demand curve shifts to the left by more than in the 
medium-debt economy as domestic demand declines because of the 
fall in investment of medium-debt and high-debt firms to zero, and 
lower consumption resulting from the elimination of dividends of 
medium-debt and high debt firms.
The comparison among low-debt, medium-debt and high-debt 
regimes suggests that the higher debt an economy has, the greater 
the output contraction following a liquidity shock. Within medium- 
debt or high-debt regime, an increase in corporate leverage tends to 
raise the magnitude of output contraction due to an adverse liquidity 
shock. Furthermore, if an increase in corporate leverage induces a 
regime shift from low-debt to medium-debt or from medium-debt to 
high-debt regime, the leverage effect is further amplified.
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D. Medium-Debt Regime with Multi-Period Financing: Deflationary 
Channel
Multi-period corporate financing can further amplify the output 
contraction through the impact of expected future deflation. This 
extra link between corporate leverage and output, which is in 
addition to the previously demonstrated contractionary channels of 
lower investment from a tighter budget constraint and wasteful 
capital sales, is discussed here using the medium-debt economy 
case. Assume now that half of medium-debt firms are financed by 
one-period bonds, while the other half tap two-period bonds. Foreign 
creditors at the beginning of time t refuse to roll over the debt that 
matures at the end of t＋l.13
Here, output in period t＋l will be given further downward impetus 
by extra deflation arising from the liquidity shock. All firms in t will 
expect medium-debt or high-debt firms with two-period bonds to 
make distress capital sales at t＋l to meet their future financing gap, 
and, they know that these sales will exert downward pressure on pt＋1 
(based on the same reasoning that sales in t reduce pt). In response, 
all firms will want to curtail their future production yt＋1. The only 
way they can reduce their future output (given a constant labor 
supply) is by shrinking kt＋1, which means cutting back on 
investment today. As before, yt is fixed by the predetermined level of  
kt and the fixed labor supply. However, the lower level of investment 
will contract the capital stock, as before, but this contraction will be 
even larger due to the expectation of price deflation next period. 
Thus, yt＋1 will be smaller when bonds are issued for different 
maturities compared to the one period case.
 
IV. Discussion: East Asian Experience
In this section, experience of output adjustment in the highly 
leveraged East Asian countries during the 1997-98 financial crisis is 
examined with a view to illustrating the validity of the assumptions 
and predictions of the model.
The trigger for the chain of events set out in the model is an 
exogenous cutoff of external credit. As shown in the middle panel of 
13 Alternatively, period t can be divided into sub-periods t1 and t2, and 
bonds can be issued at maturities of t1 and t1＋ t2.
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Figure 1, the plunges in gross private capital flows (which is the 
measure used in the World Economic Outlook of the IMF) for East 
Asia during 1998 were remarkably abrupt, large, and pervasive and 
even relatively healthy countries like Singapore and Taiwan were hit 
hard. Thus, a cutoff of credit for both low and high debt countries 
appears to be a reasonable assumption. A high level of corporate debt 
prior to the cutoff of external credit is another crucial assumption of 
the model. The pre-crisis level of corporate leveraging, as measured 
by the debt-equity ratio in 1996, is indeed quite high by 
international standards generally in East Asia, but especially for 
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand (Figure 2).14 Moreover, corporate debt 
became much higher after the crisis than before the crisis owing to 
the impact of large exchange rate depreciations on the local value of 
external debt and the buildup of arrears on domestic debt.
The model predicts that the cutoff of credit will trigger a large 
number of bankruptcies in countries with highly-leveraged corporate 
sectors. In the absence of comparable cross-country bankruptcy
14 The data set developed by Claessens et al. (1998) is for nonfinancial 
companies and comes from annual reports of those companies listed on the 
major stock exchanges in the region and from the World scope and Extel 
databases. The number of companies per country ranges from 170 for the 
Philippines to 636 for Malaysia.
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Source: World Bank (1998).
FIGURE 3
BANKRUPTCY INDICATORS IN EAST ASIA DURING 1997-98



















data, two proxies are used here. First, the World Bank (1998) 
estimated the share of “nonviable” firms (facing estimated losses 
exceeding equity) as of early 1998. These figures, which are available 
for only five East Asian countries, suggest a rough correspondence 
between corporate leverage and nonviability (Figure 3, top panel). 
Second, a comprehensive cross-country microeconomic data set of 
nonfinancial firms shows that the share of corporations that filed for 
legal creditor protection during 1997-98 was much larger in the 
highly leveraged countries (Figure 3, bottom panel), with the 
exception of Indonesia, where the incomplete implementation of 
bankruptcy and judicial reform during 1997 and 1998 delayed 
bankruptcy procedures for nonviable firms.15 Analysis of this data 
15
Bankruptcy reform developments in Indonesia are documented in the 
Share of Firms Registering for Protection from Creditor, 1997-98
Share of i s with Lo ses Exceeding Equity, 1998
Ind ia r al i Phili i s Thailan
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set concluded that leverage was an important determinant of filing 
for legal credit on protection (Claessens et al. 1999, Table 7).
Deflation in output prices is predicted by the model for countries 
with high corporate debt. At first glance, inflationary pressures in 
most East Asian countries during mid-1997 to August 1999 are not 
out of line with the pattern for the 1990s, except for Indonesia (top 2 
rows of Table 1). However, these rates of inflation are quite low for 
the highly leveraged and open countries when the large rates of 
depreciation are taken into account (bottom 2 rows of Table 1). 
Thus, deflationary pressures appear to be quite strong for the highly 
leveraged countries in East Asia.
Output of highly leveraged countries will be hit by a contraction in 
investment by corporations facing a credit cutoff, according to the 
model. During 1998, countries with higher levels of corporate debt 
(Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand) did indeed experience very sharp 
declines in investment (Table 2). These declines were so large that 
the contribution of investment to real GDP growth for the highly 
leveraged East Asian countries were equal to or even in excess of the 
overall contraction in GDP.16 These contractions were larger than 
Government of Indonesia's Letters of Intent and Memorandum of Economic 
and Financial Policies which are available on the IMF website (http:// 
www.imf.org/external/np/loi/1999/051499.htm).
16 Corporate leverage has the largest correlation with growth in 1998 across 
21 large emerging economies that experienced dropoffs in capital inflows 
during 1998 compared to the other candidate variables for the crisis listed in 
section I. In addition, regressions of growth in 1998 on corporate leverage 
and other candidate explanatory variables that predate the output contraction 
TABLE 1
INFLATION AND DEPRECIATION IN EAST ASIA, 1990-99
Hong Kong Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Taiwan Thailand
Annualized inflation 1)
June 1997 – August 1999


















June 1997 – August 1999


















Notes: 1) CPI, seasonally adjusted.
       2) Nominal effective exchange rate.
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TABLE 2
GDP GROWTH AND CONTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT AND 
INVENTORY DURING CRISIS
         (Annual growth, in percent)
East Asia Crisis, 1998-99 Tequila Crisis, 1995-96
1998 1999 1995 1996
Hong Kong 
Gross domestic product
Con. of gross fixed cap. form.
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Source: World Economic Outlook Database, IMF (1999).
Note: Changes in inventories are not reported separately.
those experienced by Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil during the 
“Tequila Crisis” of 1995 (Table 2).17 Moreover, even for 1999, invest- 
suggest that capital inflows have little explanatory power, whereas the 
corporate leverage parameter estimates consistently have the highest 
t-statistics and their omission greatly worsens the fit across different 
specifications (results are available from the authors).
17
See also Perry and Lederman (1999) and Lane et al. (1999).
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ment was not expected to contribute to growth, suggesting that at 
least in the short-term investment will not lead the recovery.
Another key prediction of the model is that output will be reduced 
by capital sales at a discount by firms struggling to stay afloat or 
creditors to bankrupt firms after a cutoff of credit. In practice, 
capital sales can be divided into three categories: (i) direct sales 
undertaken by the debtor firm directly to another firm; (ii) indirect 
sales by banks who sell goods used as collateral for loans after 
having taken the loans after nonrepayment; and, (iii) indirect sales 
by government asset management corporations (AMCs) who sell goods 
that are collateral for nonperforming loans (NPLs) that they buy from 
bad banks.
There is evidence that capital sales even within two years after the 
onset of the crisis were large enough to have macroeconomic 
consequences in East Asia, particularly in Korea.18 For example, 
during the first half of 1999, the top 5 chaebol sold $6 billion in 
assets (Reuters, August 24, 1999). The amount of collateral that 
creditors of Daewoo planned to liquidate was worth the equivalent of 
3 percent of 1998 GDP. The share of total NPLs as of March 1999 
for which debt workout agreements had been reached was 23 
percent for Korea, 17 percent for Malaysia, and 11 percent for 
Thailand (International Monetary Fund 1999). 
The available data also suggest that discounts on asset sales 
during the crisis are large. The average discount on nonperforming 
loans purchased by March 1999 by the Malaysian government AMC 
was 40 percent, while NPLs bought by the AMC of Korea averaged 55 
percent for secured loans and 97 percent for unsecured loans. While 
these NPL discounts can be viewed as a lower bound on the ultimate 
sale of the underlying collateral, they nevertheless should be 
significant. Large discounts are not surprising in light of the 
evidence on capital sales which concluded that the price of assets 
sold in distress conditions relative to their replacement value are 
low. 
V. Conclusion
This paper has provided a framework showing how a highly 
18 See Mako (2002) and International Monetary Fund (1999) for reviews of 
progress toward corporate restructuring and capital sales in East Asia.
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leveraged corporate sector can magnify the impact of a liquidity 
shock on the real economy, as seems to be happening in East Asia 
during the financial crisis. To avoid bankruptcy in the face of a 
credit cutoff, excessively leveraged firms reduce investment and sell 
their capital at a discount. Low investment and wasteful capital sales 
shrink the capital stock, trigger deflationary pressures, and thereby 
reduce output and prices. The available evidence suggests that the 
East Asian countries with the highest level of corporate leverage are 
experiencing sharp investment declines, capital sales, and the largest 
output contractions.
The analysis of this paper may have several broader implications. 
First, at the risk of stating the obvious, policy makers should take 
care to ensure that corporations do not build up levels of debt that 
could leave aggregate output excessively vulnerable to a cutoff of 
external financing. Second, excessive corporate leverage may help 
explain the sharp investment declines that corresponded to the 
largest of the output contractions in East Asia during 1998. Third, 
capital sales prompted by corporate restructuring have occurred, 
especially in Korea. While the impact on output of these sales might 
be smaller than that of investment, their novelty and potential to 
help shape the contour of the macroeconomic development of 
crisis-hit countries with highly leveraged corporate sector warrants 
close monitoring.
(Received 3 August 2007; Revised 5 December 2007)
   
Appendix: Impact of Liquidity Shocks if Bankruptcy and 
Capital Sales Occur before Production
This appendix shows that liquidity shocks reduce output in the 
current period if it is assumed that bankruptcy and capital sales 
occur before production. When bankruptcy occurs before the 
high-debt firms produce, they sell capital at liquidation value, so that 
their total output at time t is zero, and the contractionary effect of a 
liquidity shock on output is felt without a lag. After the bankruptcy 
of high-debt firms, a fraction θ2 of workers shift costly to the 
surviving firms. The labor shift increases the output of low-debt and 
medium-debt firms at time t, since the surviving firm's capital stock 
at time of liquidity shock is unchanged, but their labor utilization 
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increases by (1＋(1－v)θ2), where v is the cost of labor adjustment. 
For simplicity, suppose that capital sales liquidation price x is close 
to zero. The current output of surviving firms then does not increase 
by as much as the increase in their labor supply because of 
diminishing returns to labor given the capital stock. Therefore, the 
output at the time of liquidity shock declines. Of course, as a result 
of capital sales of medium-debt firms and bankruptcy of high-debt 
firms, output in the next period will also decline, and the high-debt 
output decline will exceed the medium-debt output decline. The key 
result of the model that the higher debt an economy has, the greater 
the output contraction following a liquidity shock, continues to hold.
Further, the price fall at the time of liquidity shock may not be as 
large as in the medium-debt case, because the total supply of the 
high-debt firms will be reduced to zero. With sufficiently low x, the 
increase in capital sales from bankruptcy is less than the reduction 
in the current output. In addition, the capital sales of the 
medium-debt firms in the high-debt regime will also be smaller than 
in the medium-debt regime because the decline in real wages allows 
the surviving firms to generate more revenues from production
(ptyt－wt lt), and the number of firms decreases from nt to nt(1－θ2). 
Hence, the aggregate supply curve in the high-debt regime is to the 
left of that for the medium-debt regime, and the price fall in the 
high-debt regime will be lower than in the medium-debt regime.
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